ISSN 0309-3700

LIVERPOOL CLASSICAL MONTHLY



Vol. 13 No 6 June 1988

Edited, printed and published at Liverpool
by Dr J. Pinsent & Ms Helena Hurt, BA
Dept of Classics and Archaeology
The University,
P.O. Box 147 Liverpool, L69 3BX,
RATES for 1988, 10 issues (not August and September)
SURFACE £8.50 UK, £9.50 Europe, $(US)17.50 elsewhere
AIR £10 Europe, $(US)27.50 N. America, $(US)35 Australasia.

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What it was fashionable some years ago to call 'the public prints' continue, unfortunately, to be the best source for information about the future of British Universities and of the Classics in them, and in 'this number of *LCM*', which subscribers will hopefully receive sooner after the May number than that was after the April, though still a good deal later than they should, the Editor will continue to pass on this information, though not at the (inordinate?) length of last month's notes. But first let him once again thank for their long-suffering and understanding all those who have not written either to complain or inquire about this prolonged hiccough.

Perhaps most interesting was a report of a radio interview with the Vice Chancellor of Manchester University, who is also chairman of the Committee of V.Cs and Principals, who said that the Grants Committee was likely to conclude that between 5 and 10 universities should stop teaching and research in Physics and Chemistry (and perhaps also Biology), and concentrate on the arts, social sciences and humanities. The newspaper listed what it called the 10 most vulnerable science departments as at Aston, Bradford, Brunel, Exeter, Keele, Salford, Aberdeen, Dundee, Stirling and Swansea. The Editor is aware that he may get stick for repeating these names, since the view is strong in Universities that to speak of a possibility or to consider its implications only helps to turn it into not a probability but a certainty, as also that a University must, by name and nature, teach all subjects and that all teachers must research into what they teach. But two of the names are of particular interest to classicists, whom, in theory, Liberal Arts Colleges and Universities could benefit since classical studies at least could well, should even, form part of the core curriculum of such places. But the Editor fears that the departmental structure would mean that even if liberated from the need to compete with expensive science for scarce resources, we would find ourselves doing so with the larger Arts departments like English and History.

The two names of interest are Exeter and Aberdeen, the former of which was mentioned last month in these notes for its increasing reputation. There had been rumours that Classics was to be discontinued at Aberdeen. The Editor does not print such information,but there recently arrived a copy of *Aurora Borealis. The Classical Newspaper*

of the North East, edited by Sonja Bowie (Robert Gordons College) and John Wilkins (University of Aberdeen) with practical assistance from Roger Witts and the University Information Office. It is printed (as an 8 page tabloid newspaper) by Aberdeen Journals Ltd., without whose support it would have been impossible. Financial assistance towards the cost of production was given by the Aberdeen Branch of the Scottish Hellenic Society. It seems primarily to be aimed at the schools as a kind of newspaper *Omnibus*, but it also contains a good deal of information that will be of interest to readers of *LCM*, as for example that Elizabeth Craik of St Andrews has signed a deal with IBM to develop computers for Classical uses. But in these notes what is of particular interest is the first article, 'The future of Classics' which begins with what must be an authoritative statement that 'The Department of Classics at the University of Aberdeen is scheduled for closure', with no admissions from autumn 1989, though it is intended that classical subjects 'will be taught at Levels 1 and 2 (i.e. for two further years) as part of the general MA degree while the teaching staff continue to teach undergraduates already embarked on honours courses'. The Editor is not quite sure what that means or entails, though he should add for overseas readers that the Scottish MA is the first degree, elsewhere the BA, and the article itself goes on to state that 'The situation is, however, more complex' and to give a resumé of the Barron report. It adds that the University has already stated that it will retain its Library holdings in Classics (but will it keep them up?).

The Editor is glad to have some solid information to which he can give publicity, while remaining sorry that so much of the future of Classics and of classical scholars seems to be being discussed privately and confidentially and not publicly as it should.

He concludes with some information about the projected Greenbank Colloquium on the history of Classical scholarship, which has already produced some response and the offer of papers. The Editor is not infrequently over-optimistic about how easily and quickly things can be done (which accounts for the present hiccup), and has realized that the Colloquium cannot now take place in the spring of 1989 but rather in the late summer, and he will try and propose and publish the dates in the next issue, or in that of October.

Dinosaurs move slowly. 

Correspondence from **Mr A. J. Barron**, Ilfracombe. 31st July 1988

Sir,

You invite comment in the April number (p.50) on John Ferguson's discussion of the spelling *formatted.*

No dictionary can keep pace with usage. *Nor* is Chambers ultimate. The *SOED* (of 1972) approves *formatted* and gives *to format* as a verb in the *Addendum.*

The noun *Format* appears in the German (abridged Muret Sanders 1902) with the main stress on *-at*, only secondary stress on *Form-* (XVII Cent.). In French *le format* (XVIII Cent.) presumably has equal stress on the *form-* and the *-at*. In both cases the further origin is the Latin *formare, formatus*. All these sources could influence English habit for the *eye, not* necessarily for the *ear* – and it is the *eye* which associates a word by way of its spelling with its past history as a clue to its sense in usage. The net result tends to be instinctive, arbitrary and irrational.

Analogies can otherwise mislead. From Latin we have *separate* and *separation*, *formation* but not yet *formate* in allied sense. If/when we do ever get a verb *to formate*, it would have priority to a past tense *formated* – and I'd vote to keep *formatted* for the computer - age to *format.*

The (now in senility) *People's Dictionary* of Webster and Wheeler listed as variants, grudgingly, at least 66 irrational doublings of consonants before *-ed*. Nearer our time I find pages 71-77 of Simeon Potter's *Our Language* (A227 of Pelican Books 1950/54) helpful on our linguistic evolution. He votes with Samuel Johnson (*Dictionary* of 1755) "not to disturb for minute propriety the orthography " of our fathers.

Yours fallibly,

Alan J.Barron.

L. F. van Ryneveld (Bloemfontein): *On the authorship of the* Apocolocyntosis *LCM* 13.6 (June 1988), 83-85

Whether Seneca the philosopher was indeed the author of the spiteful Menippean satire usually referred to as the *Apocolocyntosis* or the *Ludus de morte Claudii Caesaris* is still open to some conjecture despite arguments in favour summarized in a recent commentary by Eden[1]. There are numerous coincidences of thought and expression between such works as the *Medea, Hercules Furens, Quaestiones Naturales* and *de Clementia* on the one hand and the *Apocolocyntosis* on the other that point to Senecan authorship of the latter[2]. But perhaps the most striking item of proof has been overlooked: Seneca is a most insistent ancient authority for the basic rule of fair judgment usually formulated as *audi alteram partem*[3], and this rule constitutes a major theme of the *Apocolocyntosis*. The theme may be said to include the related notion of the sovereignty of law, with ironic support from the references to the late Claudius' over-assiduous and capricious efforts as the highest judge in the Roman Empire[4].

The statistical position in the *Apocolocyntosis* on the above-mentioned topics is as follows: *audire* as a legal technical term – 7.5, when Claudius himself refers to the times *cum causidicos audirem diem et noctem*; in 10.4 Augustus asks Claudius *quare quemquam . . . antequam audires, damnasti?*; in line 10-22 of the *nenia* in 12 the late emperor is ironically praised because he was able: . . . *discere causas,*
una tantum parte audita,
saepe neutra,
and in 14.2 Aeacus, 'the most just of men' condemns Claudius *altera parte tantum audita*. References to the *audi* rule breached include 6.2, where Claudius in his imperious manner *Febrim duci iubebat*[5], and the similar passage in 13.4[6]; Augustus' accusation in 10, the lines in the *nenia* (12) and the scene in Hades (14) (see relevant quotations above).

The rule of law is referred to in Phoebus' brilliant prophecy of a new Golden Age dawning with Nero's accession in 4.24: *legumque silentia rumpet*[7] and also in Augustus' bitter rhetorical question in 10.2 : *ideo legibus urbem fundavi . . . ?*. Added to this are references to Claudius' over-assiduity as a remarkably incompetent judge: e.g. in 7.4 he himself says *ius dicebam totis diebus mense Iulio et Augusto* (my underlining), further stressed in the following sentence when he says that *causidicos audirem diem et noctem* (7.5 quoted above).

These passages may be compared with others in undoubtedly Senecan works.

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1. P. T. Eden (ed.), Cambridge 1984, pp.1-8; cf. also A.P. Ball (ed. 2) 1902 (repr.1978), pp.23-50.
2. E.g. on historians, *Q.N.*4.3.1, cited by Eden op. cit. p.82 s.v. *fides penes auctorem erit* (*Apoc.*5.1) and numerous other instances commented on by Eden.
3. In the *TLL* section on *audire* as a judicial technical term there are ten Senecan references (*TLL* s.v. *audio*, 1283 line 41 to 1284 line 51). The significance of this statistic must of course be estimated against the vagaries of transmission of ancient texts, bearing in mind also editorial selection in *TLL*; for instance, Seneca's usage of *audire* in the juridical sense in *Apoc.*7.5 (. . . *causidicos audirem diem et noctem*) is not quoted.

Of the available legal dictionaries and encyclopedias consulted on the *audi* rule only three were found to offer an ancient source, in each case Sen., *Med.*199-200 (quoted below). These were: Burke J. (ed.), *Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law* (2nd edn., London 1977; Sisson, J. J. L., *The South African Judicial Dictionary*, Durban 1960; and Claassen, C. J., *Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases*, Durban 1975.
4. Ball, op.cit. p.9: 'Not least notorious among Claudius' peculiarities was his passion for holding court . . . the virtue of such judicial industry was less appreciated in heaven than the caprice and partiality which had often gone with it'.
5. Eden, op.cit. p.92 on *duci*: '*sc. ad supplicium vel sim.*'.
6. *quos Narcissus duci iusserat*, cited by Eden in his comment referred to in the preceding note.
7. In a note on this passage Ball (op.cit.p.171) cites 12.1: *iurisconsulti e tenebris procedebant, pallidi, graciles, vix animam habentes*, the unexpected return to legality symbolized by these wan, almost ghost-like figures, whose 'services had clearly been superfluous under Claudius, who interpreted the law himself, often idiosyncratically' (Eden, op.cit. p.130).

In *Hercules Furens*, to which Eden refers several times[8], Lycus arrogantly boasts that he, as conqueror, rules without regard for law:

> . . . *regamque cuncta sine legum metu*
> *quas arma vincunt . . .* (lines 400-401).

Under Lycus, as under Claudius, the laws are silent. Later on, Theseus describes the judicial procedure in Hades and the dreadful punishments visited upon *cruentos . . . duces* (737) and tyrants (739), and he proceeds to formulate explicit advice that rulers should be merciful in their own eventual interest: . . . *sanguine humano abstine*

> *quicumque regnas: scelera taxantur modo*
> *maiore vestra.* (745-7).

To this may be compared the closing scene of the *Apocolocyntosis*, in which Claudius, severely criticized for his dispensation of signal injustice and for his absent-minded bloodthirstiness[9], is allowed no defence by the infernal judge Aeacus, ironically characterized as *homo iustissimus*, and after an amazingly off-hand trial is handed over to Gaius' freedman 'to be a mere clerical slave, endlessly involved in other people's litigation . . . but no longer with the executive power he has possessed'[10] – a suitable fate for a bad ruler, whose *scelera* have indeed been visited upon him *modo maiore*.

If we assume that the two tales were intended to convey a 'message', there is a clear congruence in their import. It is of course quite irrelevant to consider whether people in the imperial circle at Rome in the mid-first century A.D. actually believed in the kind of Underworld described by Virgil in *Aeneid* 6[11]; the meaning conveyed by the two statements in the mythic mode is obvious enough (against these two vivid *exempla* of unjust rulers Seneca has an anecdote in *De Clementia* exhibiting Augustus as a stickler for justice)[12].

In Seneca's *Medea* the heroine's complaint that Creon has acted unjustly towards her constitutes a splendid statement of the *audi* rule not copied from Euripides' version[13]:

> *qui statuit aliquid parte inaudita altera,*
> *aequum licet statuerit, haud aequus fuit.* (199-200)

to which Creon retorts with pointed irony:

> *auditus a te Pelia supplicium tulit?* (201)

Medea is an ill-used woman, but also a criminal who has taken life without proper

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8. Eden, op.cit. p.84 on *Herculem* in 5.3: '. . . but the caricature of Hercules acquires a uniquely extra element of travesty *if* its audience has already read Seneca's *Hercules Furens*'; also p.93 of *Hercules paratragicus* and p.84 on *advexi pecus*.

9. For Claudius the unjust judge see above, on the *audi* rule breached; on his blood-letting within the imperial family, see *Apoc.*10 & 11; on the execution of senators, knights and others, cf. *Apoc.*13 & 14.

10. Eden, op.cit. p.150 s.f..

11. Even before Virgil, Lucretius eloquently dismisses Hades at 3.978-1023; E.J.Kenney (ed., Cambridge 1971, p.222) adduces Sen. *Cons.Marc.*19.4 and *Ep.*24.18; similar scepticism is snidely expressed a few decades later by Juvenal (2.149-152).

12. In the passage from Seneca's *De Clementia* cited in *TLL* s.v. *audio* (n.3 above) the tale is related of a young man whose trial Augustus had attended at the father's invitation. Seneca takes care to emphasize that the relevant facts were considered (*audita caussa, excussisque omnibus . . . et iis quae adolescens pro se dixerat, et iis quibus arguebatur . . .*) – i.e. the *audi* rule was carefully observed. It is worth noting that Augustus here provides the model of fair practice, and it is he who accuses Claudius in *Apoc.*10 of rank injustice. P. Grimal (*Seneca: Macht und Ohnmacht des Geistes*, Darmstadt 1978, p.73) says in a discussion on the *Apocolocyntosis* that Seneca '*glaubte . . . er habe die Pflicht, die Herrschaft in die Bahnen des Augustus zurückzulenken*'.

13. Though in Euripides' version the chorus does complain of injustice (e.g. line 411: *καὶ δίκα καὶ πάντα πάλιν στρέφεται* 'Justice is turned to injustice'), justice and injustice are not defined and distinguished as they are in the Latin play. On Sen. *Med.*199, C. D. N. Costa (ed., Oxford 1973, p.91) comments on *inauditus* that 'the word is commonly used in Silver and later Latin prose of an "unheard" defendant (Tac. *A.*ii.77, *Dial.*16.4, Pliny *Ep.*iv.11.6, Apul. *Met.*x.6)'. Elsewhere Tacitus, barrister and historian, indicates that people executed without benefit of a trial are to be considered innocent: . . . *inauditi atque indefensi tamquam innocentes perierant* (*Hist.*1.6).

justification, yet she accuses her judge of injustice. In a similar situation in the closing scene of the *Ludus*, Claudius does not even protest – *Claudio magis iniquum videbatur quam novum* (14.3) – Aeacus' decision not to admit a defence, corresponding to his own practice, is quite familiar to him. The insertion by Seneca of the *audi* rule in his version of the *Medea* legend seems significant, as well as the fact that it is negatively stated, with the stress on the judge's neglect of his duty – 'even a just decision is *un*just if one side has *not* been heard'. This is true also of the three versions of the *audi* rule in *Apocolocyntosis* 10 (*antequam audires*), 12 (*una tantum parte audita* | *saepe neutra*) and 14 (*illum altera tantum parte audita condemnat*).[14]

Seneca's life history – banishment at the whim of a tyrant, and eventually a death sentence without benefit of a trial – shows that the times in which he lived were such as to justify an obsession with proper legality and justice. It is certainly a fitting if unintentional tribute that his expression of the essence of justice, the *audi* rule (even today too often breached), should have been quoted in a modern South African law court[15].

Despite its cruelty, frivolity, and somewhat sloppy construction, the *Apocolocyntosis* may easily be accepted as a canonical Senecan work on account of the prominence in it of the issues outlined above[16].

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C. A. Stray (Swansea, Sociology & Anthropology): *England, culture and the 19th century. C.O.Brink on Victorian education and scholarship* *LCM* 13.6 (June 1988), 85-90

Readers of *LCM* have already been provided with a lengthy review of Brink's (hereafter B.) *English Classical Scholarship* (hereafter *ECS*) by H. D. Jocelyn, who generously sent me a copy of his review in advance of its complete publication. The present discussion differs in being concerned solely with B.'s account of education and scholarship in the Victorian age (*ECS* ch.7). What I have to say falls into three parts. The first offers a methodological critique of B.'s account; the second, an empirical supplement to it. The analysis is carried into the 20th century in the third section, which attempts to incorporate B.'s book into the history of which it treats.

I. 'Quite apart from history, it stands to reason . . .'

The measured tone of B.s preface conveys a sense of commitment controlled by detachment. But it is precisely to detachment that B. is committed. Underlying his historical narrative is a vision of the autonomy of reason, which for him is manifested in history through the practice of science. 'Science' is a category which includes critical scholarship, the differences between the natural sciences and those 'conversant with literature' being, in his words 'deeply embedded in their history, but not . . . in their essence' (*ECS* 1). How, then, does 'essence' relate to 'history'? The former consists of internally coherent and clearly demarcated categories (e.g. 'science' and 'education'). These categories are assumed to determine, in a straightforward and unproblematic way, the motives and behaviour of

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14. In *De Beneficiis* 3.22.3 Seneca makes it quite plain that even slaves have a right to be heard in cases of alleged ill-treatment by their masters.
15. Claassen (op.cit. cf. n.3 above) p.155 s.v. *audi alteram partem*.
16. The *audi* rule in the works of Seneca was traced by looking up references in dictionaries and concordances s.vv. *audire*, *ius*, *iustitia* and so on. The success of such a method is limited, as the specific words may not be used in a passage on the topic.. For instance, when in *Apoc.*6.2 Claudius orders that the goddess Febris be executed (above n.5) it is clearly a one-sided decision and just as clearly implied to be a judicial order by the Emperor, though the only legal technical term is *duci*. A scholar well-read in Seneca will almost certainly cite further passages which are very much to the point.

individuals in the phenomenal world. Thus 'no one needs to exhort the natural sciences to be scientific because that is what they are' (ibid.). Now as a characterization of the real world of scientific work – and it is only scientists, not 'science', who can meaningfully be 'exhorted' – this is disastrously inadequate (see, for example, The Double Helix, or L. S. Hearnshaw's biography of Cyril Burt).

My concern here is primarily with the Victorian age. But I note in passing that B.'s idealist approach leads to difficulties in his account of the 'essence' on which his book is focused, the '*philologia Bentleiana*'. In his treatment of Bentley and Porson it results in internalist accounts which underplay the engagement of scholarship with society (Jocelyn has emphasized the relevance of patronage and the Church). With Housman the problem is reversed: B.'s analytic isolation of his work makes it difficult to consider the nature of Housman's actual isolation from his society. We are dealing, as I shall argue below, with an academic detachment which has lost sight of its own social and intellectual bases. It is understandable, therefore, that the historical shift from Bentleian engagement to Housmanian (and Brinkian) detachment does not loom large in B.'s portrayal of the '*philologia Bentleiana*'.

B.'s account of Victorian education and scholarship hinges on the distinction between these two categories. His central conclusion is that the latter did not flourish because the Victorians preferred the former. It is only superficially paradoxical that B.'s ahistorical vision allows him to reach this respectably historicist conclusion. His analyses of educational practice on the one hand, and of Munro, Nettleship and Jebb on the other are fresh and perceptive. But when he comes to deal with Victorian educators whose contemporary reputation as scholars he cannot accept, his idealist vision becomes a distinct liability. The careers of men like Butler, Arnold and Kennedy become a series of category mistakes, and the narrative is accordingly sprinkled with judgmental terms: 'confusion' (ECS 122, 123, 128, 139, 149), 'mistake' (123, 149), 'incongruity' (118), 'misconception' (124). This is the vocabulary of B.'s vision; and my contention is that parts of his narrative are infused not with the light of reason, but with the light of a vision of reason.

The point can be substantiated by looking briefly at B.'s treatment of Butler and of J. Kennedy. Samuel Butler's edition of Aeschylus was published by the Cambridge press in 1809-15. Editor and publisher are castigated by B. for reprinting Stanley's 1664 text. Butler had asked to be released from the text; was refused permission by the Press; and afterwards declared that he 'had reason to be satisfied' with the Syndics' decision. B. sees this as evidence of Butler's 'lack of insight into the procedures of critical scholarship' (*ECS* 123). But this leaves Butler's initial request unexplained. I suggest that Butler wanted not 'a better text' but 'his text'; this would advance his reputation and increase his fee. From the Syndics' point of view, a reprinted text was a cheap text. Butler's subsequent satisfaction would then indicate simply that adequate reputation and income had accrued. It is worth noting at this point that B.'s importing of the ideal of 'critical scholarship' into the discussion is inimical to his own purposes. For it is only by exploring the assumptions and social conditions underlying productions like Butler's *Aeschylus* that we can begin to see what might be the conditions for the emergence and persistence of critical scholarship. The history of truth is vitiated by ignorance of the history of error.

The demarcation between education and scholarship reappears in B.'s account of Butler's successor at Shrewsbury, Benjamin Kennedy. Kennedy is a paradigm case of the Victorian headmaster as father-figure and romantic hero rolled into one. His thunderous naiveties drove at least some of his pupils from the repetitious boredom of the 'gerund grind' to a sense of classical literature as living creation. B. is reluctant to accept that one who was not himself a great scholar could have initiated those who were into 'the joy of knowledge for its own sake'. But Mayor, Heitland, Page and above all Munro so testified. B. is left with a puzzle; but the puzzle is an artefact of his vision. Kennedy brought the Classics alive – 'He WAS Demosthenes', said one pupil – and those who listened and watched were inspired to explore for themselves. The scholarly potential was theirs; Kennedy made possible its realization. A contemporary parallel makes the point vividly: 'The neogrammarians of today may smile at the methods of the old school. . . but those who remember the days before Curtius will never forget the debt they owe to the man who made the study of form and syntax a living thing. . . The solvent of criticism has eaten away much of the structure so proudly reared fifty years ago. . . But the life . . . abides' (B. L. Gildersleeve, 'Classical Studies in

America', *Atlantic Monthly* 78 (1896), 732).

Not all responded to Kennedy as Munro did: the young Samuel Butler, grandson of Kennedy's predecessor, was a shy boy, and was driven further into his shell by his headmaster's looming and booming. Munro was made of tougher material. One might speculate that both his toughness and his response to Kennedy the father-figure were related to his own illegitimate birth. The speculation is mine, but the information has the authority of Venn's *Alumni Cantabrigenses*. It will serve to make the point that, with Munro and Kennedy as with Butler, information must come before understanding, just as judgement should follow it. In the next section I shall try to provide relevant information on three aspects of the Victorian age which bear on the development of critical scholarship: religion, class, and academic institutions – in particular, the Cambridge Classical Tripos.

II(a) Reason and Religion

In his essay on 'Charterhouse thirty-five years ago' Charles Lamb gives an affectionate sketch of Matthew Field, who taught him there in the 1790s. Here, says Lamb, was a teacher who was at once scholar, gentleman and man of God. By the end of the Victorian period the combination was rare; and the history of classical education and scholarship in the 19th century could be written in terms of the changing relationship of those roles. I consider first the links between scholarship and religion.

Until the 'godless college in Gower Street' was founded in 1826 English education was almost entirely controlled by the Anglican Church. Within the Church 'critical reason' was in general viewed with some alarm because of its associations with the atheistic secularism of revolutionary France. From the atomism of Horne Tooke to the 'people's grammars' of Cobbett and Holyoake a strain of linguistic and social radicalism flourished in England until the Chartist threat faded in the late 1840s. The weapons for a conservative counterblast were supplied by the German romantics, in whose writings human reason was firmly embedded in national traditions of culture. The study of language, the expression of this embedded reason, was seen as an ally of religion: the science of words as a defence of the Word. Thus in the late 1830s we find the brothers Wordsworth – sons of the Master of Trinity and high Anglicans both – at work on parallel grammars of Latin and Greek designed to become standard works in the public schools. Arnold had desiderated such grammars on grounds of practicality and convenience; Charles and Christopher Wordsworth worked on a higher principle, that 'uniformity in grammar led to uniformity in religion'.

J. W. Donaldson, author of a rival grammar, belongs to the same context: the pursuit of philology in the service of religion. It led him to some strange conclusions, notably that fragments of a lost book, *JASHAR*, lay hidden in the text of the Bible (a theory which led to his dismissal as headmaster of King Edward's School, Bury). But B.'s one-word dismissals of his *New Cratylus* and *Varronianus* ('fumblings', 'fantasies', *ECS* 117) will not help us to understand Donaldson. We might begin by noting his declared concern to combat the linguistic and social radicalism of Horne Tooke (which does not appear in B.'s account), as a parallel to Arnold's determination to combat Gibbon (which does: *ECS* 121). It is even possible to establish a link between Donaldson and the critical scholarship of the 1860s: the lectures which he gave at Trinity College in the previous decade. These were attended by a small group which included Munro, Mayor and H. J. Roby. This last, a sober and judicious scholar who was offered Munro's chair when the latter resigned it, tells us in his autobiography that Donaldson 'gave me new eyes'.

The 1850s formed a turning point in the relationship between reason and religion. The intellectual centre of gravity at Cambridge was moving from 'permanent' to 'progressive' truth; the rate of ordination among graduates begins to decline c.1855; the domesticated philology of the drawing-room school led by Max Muller would soon give way to the harsher science of Sweet and the Neogrammarians. The philology which had been welcomed as an ally of the Word became a solvent of faith; and both the defence of religious truth and the potential for its undermining by reason can be seen in Donaldson's work.

II(b) Education and Class

The central conclusion of his chapter is summed up by B. as follows: 'It stands to reason that the public did not get what it did not want' (*ECS* 119). This is a remarkable statement. Restraining the temptation to subject it to a full analysis, I content myself with asking 'Who WERE the public?'. The impression one gains from B's account is that they were the groups who patronized the public schools. There were those, indeed, in the 1840s who

declared publicly that the middle classes were not only 'the glory of England' but actually constituted the people of England. This is a myth in the making; the ideological accompaniment to the triumph of the middle classes. The public schools were so called to distinguish them from the local schools which some of them had been before their 'reform'. This reform involved the abandonment of statutory duties to educate the local poor so that the schools could take fee-paying boarders supplied by the expanding railway network of the 1830s and 40s. To the middle-class groups thrown up by the industrial revolution the public schools offered the transformation of financial capital into cultural capital, money into manners. Their classical curriculum constituted the crucible in which was forged the social style of a new elite, an alliance between the old aristocracy of land and the new aristocracy of capital.

Comparison with Germany is instructive. The middle-class groups from which late 18th-century romanticism arose were politically weak, scattered across a large country not yet unified. Political weakness led to powerful dreams: against the centralized *Zivilisation* of Latinate France they built an ideology of national *Kultur* infused with the mystic radiance of Greece. On this vision was founded the academic pursuit of *Altertumswissenschaft*. It might be argued that the fading of the vision in the mid-19th century, the growth of specialization and the enlarged role of *Method*, reflected the inability of the humanist elite to maintain its position in the face of emergent rivals. In England, by contrast, the accumulated weight of the new elite, formed after industrialization and absorbing the intellectual potential of newly-emergent groups, proved strong enough to resist the penetration of science until late in the century. The English intellectuals were 'incorporated' rather than 'alienated'. Similarly the ideology of *Wissenschaft* was far removed from the comfortable and domesticated English style. The latter formed the symbolic reflexion of an assimilated elite which had presided over the reformist absorption of change. The exchange of classical quotations in college and club celebrated and reaffirmed the shared knowledge, the common socialization of this elite. The hero-worship of the compositional virtuoso is part of the taming of the romantic impulse from a powerful dream to a drawing-room display. But it should be noted that if this analysis is correct, the English and German styles have a common root in the romantic movement. It is conventional to contrast English amateurism with German professional scholarship; the contrast might be refined by comparing their relationships to a common source, the romantic urge to understand from within.

The advancing power of the middle classes in 19th-century England was buttressed by the expanding system of competitive examinations. In theory a neutral instrument which supported Merit against Patronage it became in practice an effective filtering machine, since examination success required previous tuition. Latin requirements kept out the unwashed, Greek requirements the clean but undesirable. Together with English, the classical languages formed part of a linguistic and social hierarchy. Once again the ubiquitous Butler leads the field, with the introduction at Shrewsbury of a system of promotion by merit. This enabled a bright boy to rise so fast through the school that in the days of Kennedy, who continued his predecessor's system, some of them spent four or even five years in the Sixth form (a fact, incidentally, which helps to explain not only Kennedy's remarkable run of university successes, but also the intensity of his ex-pupils' reverence). The impact on Cambridge was striking. In the 1840s one of Kennedy's pupils was rumoured never to have dropped a single mark. This was not 'critical scholarship', of course; but as Gildersleeve said of Curtius' teaching, it was a marked advance on what had come before. The new wave even lapped the Etonian shore. The young assistants recruited by Edward Hawtrey on his appointment in the mid 1830s refused to follow the inanities of the Etonian classical system: they had been taught at Cambridge by Shrewsbury men who really knew their Greek.

The expanding world of standardized courses and examinations had its centre of gravity in London rather than in Oxbridge. It gave employment to some who were excluded from the ancient universities. Men like Badham, whose connexion with F. D. Maurice ruined his chances of preferment, and Paley, whose conversion to Catholicism had a similar effect, published school editions and examined for the University of London. The leading figure in the field was Sir William Smith, examiner and editor, whose evidence on classical teaching was listened to with respect by the Clarendon Commission. It is scholarship which forms the background to the *Bibliotheca Classica*. Further investigation would be unlikely to challenge Housman's opinion of the scholarship contained in those solid mid-Victorian

volumes. But it would surely also reveal a more complex motivation than the concern for 'mutual congratulation' which he ascribes to them in his Cambridge inaugural.

II(c) Individuals and Institutions

As an epigraph to his chapter, B. gives a quotation from Clarke's *Classical Education in England 1500-1900*, which points out that the period of decline identified by Housman (c.1825-65) began just as the Cambridge Tripos was established. If it is remarkable that Clarke fails to develop the point, it is even more remarkable that B. hardly returns to it, despite having, as it were, flown it from his bowsprit. The Tripos needs a detailed and systematic investigation which would relate its structure and content to the careers of those who experienced it. A few central features are, however, clear. Most important is its relation to the Mathematical Tripos, which had been in existence for several generations when its younger sibling was born in 1824. For the first thirty years of its life the Classical Tripos was available only to those who had already secured high honours in the Mathematical Tripos. This arrangement presumably resulted from the negotiations of the early 1820s between Monk and his allies and the supporters of the established mathematical embodiment of 'permanent truth'. It has been suggested that the latter feared the popularity of composition so much that they forced the dilution of the compositional element in the new examination. Half a century later, the Cambridge consensus seems to have been that Mathematics gave a man a backbone of rigour while Classics gave him style and poise (a hint, perhaps, of the factors inimical to the development of critical scholarship).

What effect did this yoking together of courses have on undergraduates? The pressures on serious students ('reading men') must have been considerable, especially as the two sets of exams were taken only a few months apart, at the end of their undergraduate career. Some, like Paley, simply couldn't cope with the mathematics. Even those who could did not always escape damage. J. M. Wilson, the pioneer of mathematics teaching in public schools, had a mental breakdown after sitting the mathematics examinations, which not only prevented him from sitting the Classical Tripos but erased from his memory all the mathematics he had learnt. Wilson's case introduces another feature of the Mathematics/Classics relationship, for his success (he became Senior Wrangler) was achieved in part by the use of new analytical techniques. The effect of these techniques, which were introduced at Cambridge in the 1830s and 1840s, was to make the Mathematical Tripos more sophisticated, more 'professional', more difficult for the average student. It is thus likely that they set up pressures for the separation of the two courses.

Other pressures came from King's College, which abandoned its independence and submitted to university degree examinations in 1851. According to Edward Thring, then a junior fellow of the college, the coupling of the Triposes was a source of concern at King's, where the teaching was almost entirely classical. The expression of this concern may have contributed to the granting of autonomy to the Classical Tripos in 1854. By then, however, the intellectual climate as a whole was changing. New triposes had been set up; both Dissent and 'progressive' truth were becoming respectable; the rate of graduate ordination was beginning to decline. The group of young tutors led by Sidgwick and Jackson were beginning their campaign for organized classical teaching of which Cornford's 1903 *Essay in anticipation of further reform* represents a later phase.

The pace of change accelerated in the next generation. In the 70s religious and marital restrictions on fellowships were removed; in the early 80s the Tripos was split into two parts. Like its predecessor the resultant structure bore the scars of negotiation and compromise. The new specialist courses in Part II were entirely optional, a degree being obtainable on the Part I examination alone. Already in the 80s we can see new kinds of teachers (Ridgeway and Waldstein, imported to teach archaeology and history) and a new kind of student. H. D. Darbishire of St John's, for example, could only manage a II.1 in Part I because of his weakness in verse composition, but went on to an excellent First in Comparative Philology in Part II. These changes set up considerable tensions. In the 1890s Ridgeway still felt stranded between the traditional literary classicists and the archaeologists, not wholly accepted by either group.

The new 'professionals' and the established scholars of the old style can be seen in conflict in a number of different contexts. The early issues of the *ACADEMY* (1869-), for instance, carried a lengthy debate on the pronunciation of Latin, in which Max Muller's protests at the 'ugly' sounds of the reformed pronunciation contrast sharply with Munro's

concise and decisive marshalling of the evidence. Kennedy's 22-year tenure of the Cambridge Greek chair brings out the issues very clearly. In 1871 we find his unconvincing interpretations of Sophocles rejected with carefully controlled exasperation by Lewis Campbell (*J.Philology* 5 [1871], 16-17). In 1888 Henry Nettleship's review of the old man's *Revised Latin Primer* caused his daughters considerable distress (which will not have been lessened by their knowledge that they had largely written the book themselves). Marion Kennedy wrote to Charles Longman, the publisher of the *Primer*, that Nettleship had discussed the book 'in not at all a nice tone, which is very strange, especially as he is a private friend'. A great teacher and the teacher of great scholars, Kennedy was elected to the Greek chair for past achievements rather than for the promise of scholarship. It was unfortunate both for him and for his university that he outlived for so long the time when his fame was fresh.

III Past and Present

The problem of the decline of English scholarship in the Victorian age can be formulated as a series of questions. Why did it happen? Why did compositional virtuosity replace critical analysis? Why did 'true scholarship' reappear when it did? In supplementing B.'s account I have attempted to confront these questions. In doing so I have focused on the gradual detachment of scholarship from the Victorian nexus of religion, class and education. In the late 19th century classical scholarship became an academic discipline practiced by professionals within a network of institutions – learned societies and journals, departments and faculties, courses and examinations – which transformed the shape of classical scholarship.

Oxford and Cambridge changed in different ways; the differences are still visible in Greats and the Classical Tripos. Latin and Greek scholarship also took different routes: while Greek was still trailing clouds of cultural glory Latin became introverted and was more quickly professionalized. At about the same time that Housman was elected to the Kennedy chair his Trinity colleague Verrall became the first holder of the new Cambridge chair of English. The contrast sums up the difference between a scholarship which faced outward to a cultured general audience and one which addressed itself only to fellow-professionals. No wonder Housman chose Latin. His inaugural lecture issued a serious call to serious men: a call to the discipline of the professional scholar, an ascetic route to 'communion with the ancients'. Brink has responded to Housman's call, and in *ECS* has restated his message; but the extent to which this involves the practice, and defence, of a particular kind of scholarship needs to be emphasized. The contrast between Oxford and Cambridge, Greek and Latin, the claims of 'culture' and 'profession', is encapsulated in the way B. and Lloyd-Jones have described each other's publications on the history of classical scholarship. For B., Lloyd-Jones has gone 'beyond the limited professional field into the cultural penumbra of classical studies' (the reference is to *Classical Survivals* and *Blood for the Ghosts*: note the characteristic Brinkian image of the 'light of reason'). Lloyd-Jones, on the other hand, has summed up *ECS* in a review as 'this worthy, but rather stodgy little book'.

In the last century and a half, then, classical scholarship has been detached from entanglements with class, patronage and religion. For some, indeed, 'detachment' has become its ideal; and this has at times led to the assumption that it is in fact independent of what B. calls 'the civilisation on which it reposes'. Not so. Academic autonomy was recognized as a legitimate principle by English society in the 19th century. It was confirmed by the state in the 20th century, when the Treasury stepped in to compensate for the failing agricultural revenues of Oxford and Cambridge. What the state gave, the state has begun to take away. For B. the present (which, one might be forgiven for thinking, begins in the 1940s) is too near for dispassionate analysis; history belongs only to the past. But to impose this rigid division on the continuing process I have described is, I think, to adopt a counsel of despair which diminishes our understanding. Can our analyses not be informed by passion yet controlled by rigour? (G. E. Davie's *The Democratic Intellect* comes to mind). In his account of the Victorian age, I have argued, B.'s passionate commitment to detachment is not innocent of assumptions. The road to an understanding of Victorian education and scholarship must begin (though it cannot end) by establishing what the Victorians' assumptions were. As my title implies, we should ask what they turned *toward* when they 'turned their backs on Europe, science and the past'.

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Review: **C.S.Stapler** (Hendon) *LCM*13.6 (June 1988), 90-93
David Whitehead, *The Demes of Attica 508/7 - ca. 250 B.C.: a political and social study*, Princeton U.P. 1986, pp.xxviii + 485. Cloth, £44.50. ISBN 0-691-09412-8

'The need has long been recognised for a modern counterpart to Bernard Haussoullier's classic study of the internal organisation and activities of the Attic demes, *La vie Municipale en Attique* (Paris, 1984)'.

So begins the preface to *The Demes of Attica* by David Whitehead (hereafter W.), and this book is an impressive survey of the ancient evidence and modern scholarly thought on the demes of Attica, their internal administration and their participation in the wider activity of the *polis*. Indeed W. has widened Haussoullier's study of the demes of the 4th century B.C. into an examination of the demes from 508/7 to 250 B.C.. As an investigation into deme activity W.'s study complements the by now fairly extensive work on deme topography by other scholars and, with its detailed examination of all attested aspects of deme affairs, this book will long remain a standard reference work for scholars interested in Athenian political and social history.

The book divides into three main sections – a preliminary background survey, a description of the internal administration and activity of the deme, and an examination of the relationship between the demes and the *polis*. This is followed by a 'conspectus' considering the demes through history, six appendices on various topics and a prosopography of Athenians active in the demes.

Part I, *Prolegomena*, sets the scene for the book as a whole. In Chapter 1 W. seeks to place the demes in their historical context. He argues that while [Aristotle] *AP* 21 correctly ascribes to Clisthenes the formal creation of the deme system (W. disposes of the evidence which could link this with Solon or Pisistratus on pp.10-15), Clisthenes did not create the demes themselves *ex nihilo*. W. adumbrates the development of deme communities from the denuding of the Attic countryside after the collapse of Mycenaean Greece, through the gradual repopulation of the *chora* from 850 onwards. Thus the demes (even those in and around the city of Athens) were natural and not artificially contrived communities. W. rejects the idea of local politics before Clisthenes and the only communal activity he ascribes to the demes in this period is religious. Yet I wonder whether we should not also expect commercial activity in some demes, as clearly took place in the classical period (e.g. Menander, *Dyskolos* 236f. [Phyle]; *IG* i^{2}.1248.8f. [Cholargus]).

Next W. discusses the practical aspects of Clisthenes' 'reform bill', considering such topics as how the 139 deme centres were chosen and the initial registration of demesmen conducted, and the extent to which Clisthenes specified deme organization or left the demes to regulate themselves. Much of this can only be speculation, following on from the work of other scholars (in particular of A. Andrewes, *CQ* 27 [1977], 241-8), yet in his discussion of the one piece of 'solid contemporary evidence' W. is less than compelling. Combining the late 6th century decree apparently regulating judicial activity in the deme (*IG* i^{3}.2) and a fragment of Demetrius of Phaleron ascribing the creation of demarchs to *οἱ περὶ Σόλωνα* (*FGrH* 228 F 31), W. suggests that the demarchs acted as local justices in the demes from Clisthenes' reforms until 453/2 when *οἱ κατὰ δήμους δικασταί* were re-established (pp.36ff.). The main objection to this appears to be that to invest such authority in the demarchs is at variance with other attempts by Clisthenes to reduce individual influence in deme communities and to give, instead, authority to the group of demesmen as a whole. For this reason Vanderpool's suggestion that the inscription refers to local judges or courts seems preferable (*Hesperia* 11 [1942], 329-337).

Chapter 2 of Part I discusses the sources and methodology, coming, perhaps rather surprisingly, as a hiatus in the investigation into the demes. W. then turns in Part II to the internal organization of the demes and deme society.

In the first chapter of Part II W. describes the different groups of people living in the deme – the demotai, other Athenian citizens, women and metics. Next he examines the internal organization of the demes, with chapters on the deme assembly, the demarch and other deme officials, deme finance and religion. The final chapter in this part is entitled 'Deme Society', and returns to the inhabitants of the deme, examining ties of solidarity between demotai and attempting to identify the most active members of deme society. The most valuable contribution of Part II is the very detailed description of deme institutions and

procedures such as the registration of new citizens, or the appointment and duties of the various deme officials. For many points of detail it seems unlikely that the discovery of new material will greatly change W.'s conclusion on deme administration (indeed evidence discovered since Haussoullier's time has often enabled W. only to confirm Haussoullier's suggestions). W. has therefore provided a study that will become a basic handbook on deme organization. For this reason it seems a shame that we get comparatively few glimpses of daily life in the deme, although W.'s stated aim is 'to recreate something of the character and quality of life that they [i.e. the demes] provided'. His picture of the Rural Dionysia in Chapter 7 is a welcome example of the atmosphere in a deme community.

The reader would perhaps be made more aware of the vitality of deme life had W. considered the archaeological evidence more fully. I wonder if he is correct to eschew (as he does, p.xxi n.20) a consideration of the topography and monuments of the demes as evidence too specific to give a satisfactory composite picture. Hence in Chapter 2, while W. gives a very detailed account of the written sources available for a study of the demes, he does not consider archaeological evidence worthy of mention. Yet the whole concept of the deme as a physical entity is perhaps more important to his study than W. allows. For example, the feelings of community between demotai which W. discusses particularly in Chapters 3 and 8 might surely be somewhat different in nucleated settlements and in communities composed of isolated farmsteads. Yet this is a topic discussed only in an early footnote (Chapter 1 n.27, pp.9ff.). Moreover there are occasions when the evidence for the physical layout of the demes, the private houses and the public buildings, disparate and scattered though such evidence is, could complement the picture given by literary sources of the administrative, political and religious life in the deme communities. I give below two specific examples, from religion and from community life more generally.

Firstly, religion. W. mentions the evidence for deme theatres in his discussion of the Rural Dionysia. It is worth considering that not all deme theatres would have been so large or so magnificently constructed as the stone theatre at Thoricos, which seems to have been enlarged when exploitation of the silver mines increased, as if to accommodate the influx of new residents (H. F. Mussche, 'Thorikos in Archaic and Classical Times', *MIGRA* 1 [1975], 45-62, p. 52). Euonymon's theatre seems much smaller (see especially *Ergon* 1980 [1981], 24f.), and for the theatrical 'area' at Icarion see W. R. Biers and T. B. Boyd, *Hesperia* 51 (1982), 12-14. Most probably the 'theatres' in some demes were intended for more intimate and deme-oriented celebrations than was the well-built theatre at Thoricos. Excavations have also uncovered sanctuaries in some of the demes, and mention of these might have added colour to the discussion of deme religion in Chapter 7 (see, e.g. *AD* 19A [1964], 26-36, for Melite; *Hesperia* 51 [1982], 15-18, for Icarion; *BCH* 89 [1965], 23, for Erchia).

Secondly, grave stelae and peribolus tombs in the demes add another dimension to ideas about the deme community. The display of prosperity and family pride at Rhamnus, for example, complements other displays before the demotai such as the erection of monuments recording victories in the City Dionysia. Archaeological evidence would suggest that the cemetery at Rhamnus was unusual, but not unique (cf. R.S J. Garland, *BSA* 77 [1982], 125-176, on peribolus tombs).

The idea of making a display of one's status and achievements before one's fellow demesmen brings up an important question – did most citizens live in their deme? And what was the attitude to their deme of those who lived elsewhere – did they return to take part in life in the deme, for example? (Isaeus 8.15 provides one example of a man returning for the Rural Dionysia).

This question bears so heavily on how deme affairs worked that it seems strange that W. leaves any consideration of it until his final 'conspectus'. Clearly, as he states there, deme administration, such as an annually changing demarch, would be hard to organize if the deme was largely denuded of members. So the problem of residence cannot be ignored,, and perhaps could have been more satisfactorily considered in Chapter 3 ('The Deme and its Residents'). A consideration of the kind of people who moved away from the rural demes could modify the picture of the deme residents and hence of their activity. For example, men active in city politics seem to have absented themselves from their deme (and W. discusses this). The same appears to be true of members of the trierarchical class (evidence for their residence as collected in J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families*, tends towards this conclusion). We may wonder, therefore, whether the rural demes in particular were

communities of men of more moderate wealth. Might this explain the double or triple choregiae for deme festivals? And might such a society give a very particular characterization to deme administration and politics (this seems relevant to W.'s Chapter 8)? Hence the question of residence has importance for the internal organization and society of the demes, and W. should possibly have made more of this.

To conclude this consideration of Part II I have some more specific comments on particular conclusions or discussions.

Firstly, the deme assembly, the frequency and timing of its meetings (pp.90ff.). A study of deme leases provides more information on these points. With reference to the procedure at a deme assembly it is worth noting that the assembly at Halimous shows that people might leave before the end of the meeting (D.57.9f.) and that the disaster that this proved to Euxitheos in his deme assembly also befell Aeschines, so he claimed, in the city ecclesia (Aesch.3.126).

When considering how many attended the deme assemblies W. compares the two recorded quorum figures and suggests that there is 'perhaps . . . slight evidence for lower anticipated attendance in the fourth century than in the fifth' (p.357 n.29). The evidence is *I G* i^3.250.11-14, Lower Paiania (450-430 B.C.), bouleutic representation 11, quorum 100; *I G* i i^2.1183.21f., Myrrhinous (after 340 B.C.), bouleutic representation 6, quorum 30). In fact at Myrrhinous the assembly was to act like a law court and so 30 may be lower than the average attendance at a regular assembly and, since the number 30 excludes the 10 demesmen and other officials already involved in the euthuna, we may perhaps imagine an average assembly at Myrrhinous of about 50 men. The two quorum figures may therefore suggest a similar proportion of demesmen at the assemblies of the two demes.

On the diversity of deme magistrates and the overlap of their duties with those of the demarch (a point W. remarks upon at pp.127, 139f.), the reason for this is surely the *ad hoc* way the demes created the extra magistrates for themselves, simply as the need arose, so that the duties were probably never spelled out in a decree or law, and hence there was no clear demarcation of duties.

Part III is concerned with the relationship between the demes and the *polis*. Chapter 9 examines the demes' involvement with city magistrates and, in considering the appointment of city magistrates by the demes, W. offers some new suggestions for the selection procedures.

He first discusses the role of the demes in the selection of bouleutai. His reconstruction of the procedure places the actual sortition at ten separate tribal assemblies in the Theseum in Athens, but the sortition is from candidates previously selected and put forward by their deme.

Selection in the Theseum is suggested by [Arist.] *AP*.62.1 and a deme decree from Eleusis (*SEG* xxviii.103.27f.), which attests to the demesmen assembling there for the election of officials (*archairesiai*). W. suggests that selection by tribal assemblies would solve administrative problems such as the supply of deputies. In fact co-ordination at tribal level may also explain the arrangement of variations in deme quotas within the tribal prytany. Occasionally a deme might not fill its quota of bouleutai, whereupon another deme (from the same prytany) usually supplied an extra man (Traill, *Hesp.* suppl. 14 [1975], 14ff.). Where this occurred the two demes are rarely of the same trittys, or geographically close, and so this may be a tribal, not a local (and unofficial) deme arrangement. However, there is still the problem, which W. is unable to explain satisfactorily, that the decree of Eleusis may refer more naturally to a meeting of a deme assembly, and it seems a little strange that a deme should conduct its own business (receiving payment for a deme lease) within a tribal meeting.

W. next considers the appointment of smaller boards of city magistrates (pp.270ff., Section 2, 'The Magistrates'). His concern is only with sortitive magistrates and he takes as his starting point [Aristotle]'s description of past and present procedure (in *AP* 62.1). Although [Aristotle] says that archons and other magistrates (with a property qualification?) were appointed in both procedures 'from the whole tribe' (i.e with no regard for demes) W. considers that the demes were involved at a time before the 'past' procedure came into operation.

W. prefers the text of [Aristotle] *AP*.22.5 to read that in 487/6 the archons were appointed by lot from 500 *prokritoi* (not the emended 100) previously selected by the demesmen, and so suggests that this was the procedure for the selection not only of the archons, but of *all* sortitive city magistrates, and that this procedure continued until the number of magistrates

was greater than 500 (sometime between 462 and 431), whereupon the bipartite system described by [Aristotle] in *AP*.62.1 was introduced. However W.'s early system is possibly too complicated to have worked satisfactorily. Some magistracies were limited to certain property classes, and appointment to these could not be a straightforward selection from the 500.

Finally W. considers the question of the procedure described by [Aristotle] whereby formerly some offices were 'distributed to the demes in accordance with an allotment in the Theseum' (*AP*.62.1). He agrees with the reconstruction of M. Lang, as opposed to that of E. S. Staveley, of 10 separate tribal assemblies, each selecting for the magistracies from 50 candidates put forward from the demes according to the bouleutic quotas. However W. (following other scholars) suggests a broader interpretation of the abuse of the system than Miss Lang offers.

Of particular interest in Chapter 10 is W.'s discussion of the extent to which the deme served as a power base or as a training ground for the political leaders of the city.. The evidence suggests that such men rarely participated in the political activity of their deme, proposing deme decrees or serving as deme magistrate, and W. is surely correct to interpret it thus. Similarly it is indisputable that the leaders in city politics did not regularly act as deme liturgists or patrons of their demesmen as we hear of Cimon doing ([Arist.] *AP*.27.3). While W. may minimize expenditure as a political factor after 460 (see P. J. Rhodes, *JHS* 106 [1986], 132-144), and the evidence certainly does not point to expenditure in the demes, W. should consider one attested political mobilization of demesmen in the late 5th century (Eupolis, *Prospaltoi* fr.244a).

The final pages of the book contain a very useful prosopography of the men and women named in deme documents or otherwise attested as active in the demes. I have five additions to make to this catalogue.

W. no.159 E . . .Gna thonos (*PA* 3050). K. Clinton (*The Sacred Officials of the Eleusinian Mysteries, T.A.Philos.S* LXIV.iii.1974, p.19) has suggested this man's name as Euthias from the accounts of the Eleusinian epistatai of 329/8, *IG*.i i².1672.56, 58.

The two new inscriptions from Thoricos provide four names for Thoricos:

Lysippides, demarch, end of the 5th century (*Thoricos* 8 [1972/1976].175 no.75
Teleas, proposer of *Thoricos* 8 (1972/1976) 175 no.75
Democharides
Democharesˇ choregi in *Thoricos* 8 (1972/1976) 177f. no.76.



After more than 450 pages the reader cannot but feel amply supplied with details of matters pertaining to the Clisthenic demes and also fully aware of the problems and controversies that such a study encounters. W. claims two aims for his study – to provide a reference handbook for anyone wishing to learn the state of present knowledge on the internal organization and activities of the demes, and to recreate something of the life in them. My general impression of this book is that it has succeeded admirably in the first of these aims but has perhaps been less successful in the second.

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Review:**H. D. Jocelyn** (Manchester)

A. G. Luciani, *'Il mito di Prometeo' e altri saggi*, Rome, Iacelli (Via Palestro, 32/a), 1988, pp.70. L.15 000

This volume contains five essays on a variety of literary and historical topics. Professor Luciani is widely read in the literature of modern Europe as well as in the classics. The hold taken on his imagination and feelings by what he has read comes through vividly in the style of his essays. If a single recurring theme can be discerned, it is that there are, or were, in the world powers beyond even divine control. The essayist's old-fashioned audacity in confronting the whole of Graeco-Roman culture must certainly be admired. As to whether it should be imitated, opinions will differ.

The first essay points out that the suffering protagonist of the Προμηθεὺς δεσμώτης is a god, not a mortal like the other Aeschylean personages which critics discuss, and argues that much of the case against the tragedy's authenticity misses the point. Luciani finds a degree of unity in all Greek treatments of the myth of Prometheus. He links the view of the power of necessity which 'Aeschylus' expresses with Homer's. Modern treatments of the myth on the other hand seem to him all to play down or ignore the divinity of the central figure. True enough.

The second essay endeavours to shift the centre of gravity of the final book of the *Iliad* from the confrontation between Priam and Achilles over Hector's corpse to two more general themes: the one the inevitability of death, for Achilles and Priam as much as for the already dead Patroclus and Hector, the other the involvement of the gods in human misery. Some students of Homer will continue to prefer stage tragedy to philosophy as their point of reference.

The third essay discusses the seemingly contradictory elements of the speech which Herodas' brothel-keeper makes to a Coan citizen jury: on the one hand the grandiose tone, the claim to the protection of civilised law and convention; on the other the recognition of the speaker's own likeness to his adversary and the admission of a natural lust for money. According to Luciani, the mimiambic brothel-keeper incapsulates the spirit of post-classical Greece. A divertingly provocative point of view.

The fourth essay takes up the much debated issue of the final strophe of Catullus' 51st poem and plumps for the authenticity of this strophe. For Luciani the reflexion on human frailty which we read here put a brake to Catullus' passion just as one on divine power would have put a brake to Sappho's. The curtailed fifth strophe of fr. 31 (Lobel and Page) is held to have originally contained a statement about the unpredictable and uncontrollable influence exercised by the gods on human fortunes, a statement which brought the poem around to the point whence it started, namely the association of Sappho's rival with divinity. Catullus, according to Luciani, translated Sappho's doubts regarding the salutariness of her passion in terms of a first-century B.C. Roman sensibility; the word *otium* denoted in vv. 13, 14, 15 not only absence of honourable employment but also indulgence in positively dishonourable pastimes; the *reges* and the *urbes* of vv. 15-16, on the other hand, belonged to the world of heroic poetry rather than to the historical world discussed by political philosophers; the power of ancient poetical tradition in short drove Catullus as strongly as it did Sappho, but in a way modified by several further centuries of creativity. The argument as to whether Catullus' poem was in any meaningful sense a 'translation' will never end. I shall permit myself just one observation. First century readers of Sappho's poems thought she was some sort of whore. Fr. 31 is about a homosexual passion. Catullus on the other hand was a male of high social status. His passion was a heterosexual one. It seems unlikely therefore that moralizing on his part would have echoed at all closely any moralizing Sappho might have indulged in.

The final essay is the most ambitious of the five, striding confidently through the history of Roman military organisation and activity from the time of the fortification of the Palatine and the Capitol to that of Theodoric the Great. Luciani takes a fashionably unsentimental view of the motives behind the wars which Rome waged, although, curiously, he passes over the subjection of the cities of Latium and the rest of the peninsula as 'Rome's Italic affirmation', as 'a vital necessity rather than a deliberate conquest' (p.47). He writes interestingly on the various ideological dresses in which Roman 'organised violence' was clothed: the promulgation of the concept of the nation in arms defending itself, the treatment of history as a record of military victories, the ceremonial celebration of success. Many topics are dealt with so briefly and so gnomically as to disappoint the expectations they initially raise. I think particularly of the theological problems posed for the Christian communities by the armed might of the Empire and the military problems which these communities posed in turn for the imperial authorities (pp. 58-9). A literary form less restrictive than the essay was needed to cope adequately with such a subject.

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H. MacL. Currie (Teesside Polytechnic): *Lucretius 1.101 and Virgil,* Aeneid *1.33: two of a kind.* *LCM* 13.6 (Jun 1988), 96

tantum religio potuit suadere malorum Lucr.1.101
tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem Virg.A.1.33

Each of these very famous lines is the cardinal one in its particular poem, announcing near the beginning in summary form the central theme, and thus acting as a motto for the work. But they are more than 'programmatic'; they are related, for Virgil is surely here echoing Lucretius as he so often does elsewhere – nearly every page testifies to his admiration for his great predecessor. No commentator seems to have observed the relationship of the two verses both in general shape (*tantum / tantae* in the first place, the same scansion to the third foot caesura, and a present infinitive in penultimate position) and in essential function.

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Corrigenda. The new technology has not overcome the Editor's unfortunate habit of introducing what are sometimes important errors into contributions, and he ends this number with a list of corrections to articles in the April and May issues, with apologies for them to the unhappy authors.
To that of **D.N.Levin** on Heliodorus, *LCM* 13.4 (Apr. 1988), 64,
line 2, for *Romans grec et latins* read *Romans grecs et latins.*
line 6, for *Aethipoica* read *Aethiopica*
lines 15-16, for 'consisting not not sheep' read 'consisting not of sheep'
line 38, for 'the novelists offers' read 'the novelist offers'.
To that of **Mogens Herman Hansen**, who is at Copenhagen University and not at Oslo, on Athenian *bouleutai*, *LCM* 13.5 (May 1988), 67-69,
p.67, the end of the final sentence of the second paragraph in **A. The average age of the *bouleutai*** should read 'and in the above calculation I have taken 45+ to be 45, 50+ to be 50 etc..'.
Readers in libraries are asked to correct the original version to avoid misunderstanding by subsequent readers.
To the review by **Duncan Kennedy**, *LCM* 13.5 (May 1988), 72-78, of the book by Molly Myerowitz (not, as was printed, Meyerowitz, and to her too the Editor makes apology),
at the top of p.73, after 'and heterosexual' insert 'in its constitution of sexual identity, difference and otherness'.
p.75, first full paragraph, in the phrase before the indication of n.9, before 'economic and political situations' insert 'social,'.
p.76, line 4, after 'It is the abstraction' add 'of behaviour from the context of power, of compliance or opposition,'
p.77, in the second full paragraph the bracketed numerical reference should be '108-118'.
p.78, at the beginning of the third line before the end of the article the word 'here' should be deleted; in n.20 the first sentence should end with a question mark ('?'), in the fourth line 'smooth' and 'operation' should be separated, and in the sixth the word 'insofar' deleted.
In the translation of Catullus 85 by **M.A.Greenwood**, *LCM* 13.5 (May 1988), 8,
the first sentence should read 'Hate and love her, I do.', without the 'her' after 'hate', and the author comments that: "My rendering made an attempt to reproduce faithfully the juxtaposition (almost) of the polar opposites 'love' and 'hate'. My original 'hate and love her', to a large degree, mirrors the original 'odi et amo' – the subject of both verbs being supplied by the 'I' of 'I do'. The first 'her' seems redundant and also creates. I think, an unwieldy balance.".

The Editor still lives in hope that one day it may be possible to send proof to authors, or to make use of skilled proof-readers, but until then he can only promise to try and eliminate such errors in future, while continuing to crave the indulgence of readers and more especially of contributors.

As a sting in the tail he gives details of the rates for 1989. Surface: £9.50 UK, £10.50 Europe, $(US)18.50 elsewhere; Air; £11 Europe, $(US)35 Australasia, $(US)27.50 elsewhere. But subscribers are asked NOT to pay until invoiced with the November number.